- 68 - earthquake, because the gates and access points would then be blocked (triggering of the "plutonium strong-box" response). The backup electricity supplies would generally be unavailable in an earthquake. Periodic inspections are not exhaustively carried out or followed-up. Means of communication The means of telecommunication used in a crisis are diversified but not redundant. They are backed up for a limited duration, about a few hours. Most of the sites inspected are equipped with wireless connections constituting the only operational means of alert and communication in the event of an earthquake or flood type severe accident, with the exception of ILL Grenoble (landline telephone network only, but a satellite phone has been ordered). These resources must necessarily be operational in the event of an earthquake. The means of communication are generally known and periodically checked. However, on the Tricastin and Saclay sites, the minimum means required (fax, telephones, etc.) are neither identified nor checked in the control rooms, which means that information to the site PC cannot be effectively guaranteed (no written confirmation via a standard message for example). With regard to the Tricastin site, another area for improvement is the provision of a dedicated means of communication for the FLS, in order to improve coordination with the ELPI and the various crisis PCs. In the event of a severe accident such as an earthquake or flooding, the licensees generally have means of communication that are robust enough to trigger the national alert. However, there is insufficient back-up duration to provide more than a few hours of information transmission. Alert systems Automatic population alert systems are deployed on most sites, except for ILL Grenoble and FBFC, where this is being planned. However, they would cease to be operational in an earthquake, flood or loss of electrical power situation. Unlisted telephone subscribers are sometimes excluded from this alert system (detected at La Hague). Like the national alert siren, which is a regulatory requirements, the automatic population alert system is a good practice that should be adopted as standard by all the facilities. 3.6.6 Crisis premises and assembly points Habitability The crisis premises are robust enough to remain accessible in the event of flooding. However they are not generally seismic qualified (ATPu, Phénix, Mélox, FLS and support services at Saclay, GB II, FBFC). All the crisis premises at Tricastin would not withstand a SSE. This point was also identified during the CSAs. Protection equipment With the exception of Phénix, most of the control rooms are not equipped with HEPA filters that would enable a healthy atmosphere to be maintained in the event of releases on the site (ATPu, Masurca, Osiris, La Hague, Mélox). The proposed means of mitigation would then be: wearing masks (La Hague): this could lead to difficulties in the performance of tasks and communication between individuals; deactivating the ventilation (Mélox): the risk of anoxia in the room should be examined, given the number of staff present and the prevailing crisis situation. The inspections sometimes revealed insufficient monitoring of the equipment made available to the staff in the event of a crisis (ILL, Phénix, local PCs at CEA Saclay).
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