and inspections until May 2024, enabling the level-1 NPE conformity assessment reports and the reactor nuclear steam supply system report to be issued. Thus, between the start of 2024 and issuance of the commissioning authorisation (7 May 2024), ASN’s oversight action was equivalent to 18 days of inspection on the Flamanville EPR reactor. Since the reactor was commissioned, ASN has directed its oversight essentially towards the addressing of significant events, monitoring the action taken further to unforeseen events encountered by the licensee and monitoring the startup tests. For this startup phase, ASN’s oversight action was equivalent to nine days of inspection. As concerns the post-commissioning reactor startup operations, ASN considers that the licensee managed the activities proficiently, particularly the startup tests, and dealt with the unforeseen events adequately. EDF has notified a large number of safety-significant events since the reactor was commissioned, of which about a third have been rated level 1 on the INES scale. ASN is particularly attentive with regard to the analysis of the root causes of these events and the action taken by EDF to build on the lessons learned from the events and safeguard the forthcoming startup activities and future operation of the reactor. The large number of events notified is linked in particular to the rise in the personnel’s competence in the implementation of the first reactor operation actions and the transition from a worksite culture to an operational culture. The large majority of the events have human or organisational causes; few of them are associated with equipment failures. Furthermore, a large proportion of the events are linked to human errors that are detected immediately with rapid restoration of facility conformity. ASN considers that the measures taken by EDF further to these findings are relevant and appropriate for the difficulties encountered during this phase. More specifically, ASN expects the licensee to demonstrate greater rigour, notably in the application of the fundamentals of facility operational management. The licensee must remain vigilant regarding the control of reactivity and the assimilation of operation of the main emergency generator sets. Alongside commissioning and startup, ASN initiated inspections – as it does on the other EDF reactors – on varied themes such as containment, control of the fire risk, environmental discharges, waste management, command of configuring the facility and in-service monitoring of NPE. ASN thus carried out oversight actions on these subjects equivalent to ten days of inspection and considers that EDF’s organisation is satisfactory, except for the monitoring and taking of water intakes and effluent discharges, and for waste management. On these points ASN expects the licensee to improve its knowledge and management of the equipment involved in discharge monitoring, and considers that the organisation of waste transfer management must be improved in view of the future reactor outages. ASN also ensures the labour inspection duties on the Flamanville EPR reactor. In 2024, apart from checking companies’ compliance with the provisions of labour law, ASN examined more particularly the conformity of the air purification systems of the work spaces. ASN considers that the safety organisation is appropriate on the whole. MANCHE WASTE REPOSITORY The Manche waste repository (CSM), which was commissioned in 1969, was the first radioactive waste repository operated in France. 527,225 m3 of waste packages are emplaced in it. The last waste packages to enter this facility were accepted in July 1994. From the regulatory aspect, the CSM is in the decommissioning phase (operations prior to its closure) until the installation of the long-term cover is completed. An ASN resolution shall specify the date of closure of the repository (entry into monitoring and surveillance phase) and the minimum duration of the monitoring and surveillance phase. On 29 April 2024, after completing its examination of the periodic safety review report submitted by Andra in 2019, ASN authorised the continued operation of the repository. It has nevertheless issued a number of requirements aiming to continue the studies on the behaviour of the existing cover, of the long-term cover and preservation of the site memory. One requirement also concerns the continuation of the studies into the retrieval of packagings containing long-lived radionuclides. ASN also considers that the organisation defined and implemented for operation of the CSM facilities with regard to safety, radiation protection, environmental monitoring and meeting commitments is broadly satisfactory. As part of the continuous improvement process, the licensee must nevertheless consolidate, within its baseline requirements, the information relative to the fraud risk analysis, particularly with respect to outside contractors. NATIONAL LARGE HEAVY ION ACCELERATOR The National Large Heavy Ion Accelerator (Ganil) economic interest group was authorised in 1980 to create an ion accelerator in Caen (BNI 113). This research facility produces, accelerates and distributes ion beams with various energy levels to study the structure of the atom. The high-energy beams produce strong fields of ionising radiation, activating the materials in contact, which then emit radiation even after the beams have stopped. Irradiation thus constitutes the main risk created by Ganil. “Exotic nuclei” are nuclei which do not exist naturally on Earth. They are created artificially in Ganil for nuclear physics experiments on the origins and structure of matter. In order to produce these exotic nuclei, Ganil was authorised in 2012 to build phase 1 of the SPIRAL2 project, whose commissioning was authorised by ASN in 2019. ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 75 Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection NORMANDIE
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