The polluted sites and soils in Île-de-France In Île‑de‑France, the Paris division oversees the depollution activities for contaminated radiological sites, which usually concerns legacy contamination resulting from past industrial or research activities which used radium. The actors can be industrial players, but also private individuals. The Paris division can, at the request of the département Prefect, give technical opinions on the planned pollution management measures and on the effective performance of remediation work (see chapter 15, point 4 of the full ASN Report). On account of its expertise in the risks presented by polluted sites and soils, the Paris division of ASN issued in 2024: ∙ three opinions concerning the remediation operations or their follow-ups: stopping of the monitoring in the vicinity of the Orme des Merisiers landfill in Saint‑Aubin (Essonne département), total clean-out of a construction worksite in Gentilly (Val-de-Marne département) and remediation of a private individual’s parcel of land in Gif‑sur‑Yvette (Essonne département); ∙ four opinions concerning management of the pollution of the sites of Budin, Fort d’Aubervilliers and Charvet in the Seine-Saint-Denis départment, and Vaujours in the SeineSaint-Denis and Seine-et-Marne départements; ∙ two opinions for the environmental authority concerning the Public Development Zone (ZAC) in Aubervilliers (Seine-SaintDenis département) and the Clamart college ZAC (Hautsde-Seine département); ∙ one opinion on a verification concerning the flooding of a college near the Federal Mogul site in Gif‑sur‑Yvette (Essonne département). Furthermore, in 2024 the Paris division carried out four inspections to check the clean-out or development operations on four different sites, namely the old Vaujours Fort, a former Marie Curie laboratory in Arcueil (Val-de-Marne département), Charvet – VLM in Île Saint‑Denis (SeineSaint-Denis département) and the Curie Institute (Paris). Furthermore, as part of the monitoring of these long-term clean-out operations which have been in progress for several years, the Paris division also took part in the monitoring commissions of the Vaujours Fort site and the Marie Curie laboratory in Arcueil. The Paris division also carried out the following actions in 2024: ∙ three requests to the French Institute of Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) for verifications and placing in safe condition after radioactive objects were discovered in the homes of private individuals and in a high school in Val‑de‑Marne; ∙ various technical meetings with the Prefectoral body and the Regional and Interdepartmental Directorate for the Environment, Development and Transport (DRIEAT) concerning depollution of the Charvet – VLM site; ∙ drafting of a soil hazard information sector concerning the residual radiological contamination of a land parcel in Gif‑sur‑Yvette after remediation; ∙ various technical interchanges bringing together the Prefectoral administration, DRIEAT, ASN, IRSN, the design office and the project sponsor, concerning the diagnosis of the polluted Galeries Lafayette site in Seine‑Saint‑Denis, with a view to its remediation; ∙ a technical meeting with the town council of Gif‑sur‑Yvette and the DRIEAT concerning the future of the Federal Mogul site; ∙ responses to requests from private individuals faced with radiological contamination problems in certain areas of Gif‑sur‑Yvette. Assessment of the CEA Fontenay-aux-Roses site ASN considers that the level of safety of the CEA Fontenay-aux-Roses site is acceptable. CEA must nevertheless maintain its efforts to ensure the operational safety of its facilities. After delays identified in the preceding years in the performance of the studies, in project programming and in the decommissioning schedule of the nuclear installations of Fontenay‑aux‑Roses, two of the CEA’s major decommissioning-related worksites were stopped for contractual and technical reasons in 2023. This situation led to technical changes in the choice of equipment design and pushing back of the decommissioning time frames. CEA must be particularly vigilant regarding the coordination of the files and the work planned on the site in order to reduce the dispersible radiological inventory within the facilities. It must also continue to implement strong measures to control and render reliable the project time frames, particularly the deadlines for submission of the decommissioning worksite preparatory studies. In 2023, in view of the conclusions of the periodic safety review of BNI 165, ASN regulated its continued operation through a resolution setting technical requirements. With regard to BNI 166, in view of CEA’s commitments and the action plan established at the end of the periodic safety review and further to its examination of the concluding report of the said review, ASN considered in 2024 that it had no objection to the continued operation of BNI 166. The inspections ASN carried out in 2024 found TSR management to be satisfactory and an improvement in waste management in one of the BNI 166 buildings. Nevertheless, the areas requiring close attention – concerning in particular the emergency management means and control of the fire risk – still persist after several years. An update of the PUI is expected further to the changes in the emergency premises in particular. Despite the compliance work already undertaken on one of the BNI 165 buildings, the efforts must be continued in 2025 to achieve the required level of safety. Although the number of significant events notified is lower than in the preceding years, they mainly relate to fire. In view of the recurrence of this subject, ASN considers that an in-depth analysis of the causes is necessary. Lastly, ASN underlines with approval the steps taken by CEA in 2024 to improve the safety of the facilities. These include a complete update of the RGEs, which had been obsolete for several years, and the implementation of a maintenance action plan. This plan has two main objectives: improve knowledge and command of the physical configuring of the facilities in relation with the components important for the protection of interests, and tighten daily work monitoring by creating a work coordination office. ASN enjoins the licensee to continue its actions in 2025. ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 71 Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection ÎLE-DE-FRANCE
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