With regard to the possible operation of the current fleet of reactors beyond 60 years and on the basis of the work done by EDF, the year 2023 saw identification of the main technical subjects requiring specific analysis, or even research and development, ahead of the periodic safety reviews. The conclusions of EDF’s early analyses will be reviewed so that ASNR can issue a position statement in 2026. Finally, since they began operating, the operational baseline requirements of the reactors, in particular their General Operating Rules (RGEs), have become increasingly complex, notably to take account of OEF and reassessment of the threats from external hazards. This increased complexity may result in problems with applying the RGEs, or the operators may even lose sight of the purpose of their actions, which has consequences for risk management. EDF has started a short, medium and long-term simplification process, which has already led to exchanges with ASN and IRSN. At the same time, ASN called the profession together in 2024, for a round of discussions with the Steering Committee for Social, Human and Organisational Factors. A summary of this work will be published in 2025. Stress corrosion lessons to be consolidated The existence of the stress corrosion phenomenon affecting certain auxiliary piping was discovered at the end of 2021 and led to a strategy of systematic replacement of the lines considered to be susceptible in 2023, and increasingly wide-ranging inspections which will continue on the entire fleet up until 2025. On the occasion of the next periodic safety reviews, the lessons learned will need to be incorporated by EDF into its maintenance programmes. ASN in particular considers that the hypotheses concerning the lack of susceptibility to degradation mechanisms, adopted for certain zones which are not monitored by a preventive maintenance programme, must be backed up by a programme of additional investigations. Monitoring the commissioning of the Flamanville EPR and the EPR 2 programme Following the examination carried out by ASN with the support of IRSN, and after consulting the public about EDF’s dossier, the ASN decision of 7 May 2024 authorised commissioning of the Flamanville EPR reactor, thus allowing EDF to load nuclear fuel and carry out start-up tests. This authorisation comprised technical prescriptions concerning the performance of the tests, defining the deadline for replacement of certain components and stipulating provisions for the incorporation of OEF. Since this authorisation, ASN holds daily discussions with the site and, in 2024, carried out ten or so commissioning follow-up inspections, notably at the most important stages. The licensee encountered various equipment issues, which delayed the reactor’s power-up, but ASN has not at this stage identified any anomaly in the results of the start-up tests. About fifty significant safety events were however declared by the licensee between commissioning and the end of 2024, a rate that is significantly higher than expected, even for a new reactor. ASN was particularly vigilant on this subject, notably during inspections, and at this point considers the measures taken by the licensee to be pertinent. EDF has started a programme to build EPR 2 type reactors in France. The first reactor pairs will be built at Penly, Gravelines and Bugey. The creation authorisation application for a Basic Nuclear Installation (BNI) on the Penly site, submitted by EDF in 2023, is being examined and should reach a conclusion in 2027. Given the lessons learned from the Flamanville EPR project, ASN has initiated a process to monitor EDF’s project organisation and management, as well as management of the supply chain for safety-important equipment. Reception of the first examination files for small modular reactor projects confirms ASN’s prior positions regarding the need for a systemic approach In 2024, interest in SMRs, with more or less ambitious innovations, remained high, in the search for decarbonised energy production solutions. This context confirmed the pertinence of the organisation and the preparatory exchanges framework created by ASN in 2023 to support the new players, start-ups in particular, lead national and international discussions on the safety objectives to be applied to these objects and understand the diversity of designs and innovations. In 2024, the first creation authorisation application files or requests for opinions on the safety options were submitted for projects supported by the “France 2030” programme. In this context, a number of issues are crucial. First of all, most of these reactors should be located on the non-nuclear sites of their customers. This type of site can be in areas comprising major industrial or natural risks, or in immediate proximity to densely inhabited areas, which would make it complicated to implement population and environment protection measures in the Editorial by the Commission 4 ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024
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