Abstracts of the ASN Report 2024

TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES The Transport of Radioactive Substances (TSR) involves numerous players, the carriers of course, but also the consignors, the package designers and manufacturers, etc. The vast majority of shipments is linked to the needs of the non-nuclear industry, the medical sector or research. ASN considers that in 2024, the safety of TSR is on the whole satisfactory, as in previous years. Although a few transport operations - mainly by road – did suffer incidents, these must be put into perspective against the 770,000 transport operations carried out each year. The number of significant TSR events on the public highway is up on 2023, with a handful of events rated level 1 on the INES scale. This increase is essentially the result of events rated level 0 on the INES scale, with 16 more events than in 2023. This increase reflects increasing awareness on the part of the licensees of the good reasons for notifying a significant event. In 2024, nearly one quarter of the significant events notified to ASN concern road transport of radiopharmaceutical products, even if this proportion has fallen in recent years; a slight upturn in the number of events concerning the transport of gamma ray projectors is also observed. On the whole, the events mainly comprise: ∙material non-conformities affecting a package (notably damaged packaging) or its stowage on the conveyance, thereby weakening the strength of the package (whether or not an accident occurs). These cases do not concern transports of spent fuels or highly radioactive waste and primarily concern transports for small-scale nuclear activities; ∙exceeding of the limits set by the regulations, usually by a small amount, for the dose rates or contamination of a package; ∙errors or omissions in package labelling, mainly for transports concerning smallscale nuclear activities; ∙delivery errors concerning radiopharmaceutical products. As these products are often similar from one hospital unit to another, most of them could be used for patient treatment without any impact. The inspections carried out by ASN also frequently identify such deviations. The consignors and carriers must therefore demonstrate greater rigorousness in dayto-day operations. With regard to transports for Basic Nuclear Installations (BNIs), ASN finds that the licensees carry out numerous checks and are therefore better able to detect any deviations. Package tie-down, the radiological cleanness of the spent fuel packages, and the tightening of the package screws remain points requiring particular vigilance, in particular at EDF. For BNIs performing research programmes, ASN considers that the consignors must further improve how they demonstrate that the contents actually loaded into the packaging comply with the specifications of the package model approval certificates and the corresponding safety files, notably when this demonstration is carried out by a third-party company. In addition, at the La Hague plant, Orano Recyclage reinforced the safety of on-site transports using mobile docking chambers (EMEM), capable of transporting samples, equipment or irradiating technological waste, adding mechanical protection and using a new transport trailer. With respect to transports concerning small-scale nuclear activities, the ASN inspections confirm significant disparities from one carrier to another. The deviations most frequently identified concern the content and actual implementation of the worker radiation protection programme, the QMS, or actual compliance with the procedures put into place. The checks to be carried out prior to shipment of a package must therefore be improved. For example, the inspections concerning the transport of gamma ray projectors regularly reveal inappropriate stowage or tie-down. At a time when the uses of radionuclides in the medical sector are generating a high volume of transport traffic, progress is still needed regarding familiarity with the regulations applicable to these transport operations and the arrangements made by certain hospitals or nuclear medicine centres for the shipment and reception of packages. The QMS have not yet been formally set out and deployed, more specifically with regard to the responsibilities of each of the personnel involved. ASN considers that the radiation protection of carriers of radiopharmaceutical products, who are significantly more exposed than the average worker, remains a point warranting particular attention. For transport operations involving packages that do not require ASN approval, progress continues to be observed by comparison with previous years, along with better application of the recommendations given in ASN Guide No. 7 (volume 3). The improvements still to be made generally concern the description of the authorised contents per type of packaging, the demonstration that there is no loss or dispersion of the radioactive content under normal transport conditions, and that is impossible to exceed the applicable dose rate limits with the maximum authorised content. Finally, ASN points out that TSR may be a limiting factor for certain projects, concerning both BNIs and small-scale nuclear activities (for example, the transport of irradiated targets needed for medical applications). In terms of forward planning, ASN therefore asks the licensees to exercise vigilance regarding packaging availability, if necessary ensuring that they are available in sufficient numbers, as well as the existence of other package models which could replace those normally used in the event of any problem affecting them. ASN Assessments ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 31

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