- 45 - To achieve these goals, the assembly points must be at least equipped with a system for counting the personnel assembled in them, suitable means of communication for the dissemination of information, means of communication with the emergency bunker (BDS) and means for monitoring the radiological conditions. These assembly points must be equipped with a mechanical ventilation system that can be stopped. All the sites have a sufficient number of well-distributed assembly points. They are clearly marked on the site drawings and the access routes are signposted. On only one site do the staff directions to these points need to be improved. In these assembly points, personnel counting by means of badges has become generalised on the sites. In general, all the necessary equipment is available: means for checking bodily contamination, radiation meters, means of communication with the other premises and megaphones for dissemination of information to the personnel present, iodine tablets (sometimes not available in-situ but brought from the emergency bunker), emergency directory, lamps, armbands. Some sites can cut off the ventilation in the assembly points, which is a good practice for premises outside nuclear islands which is identified in the EDF PUI frame of reference. The distribution and upkeep of the assembly points on the sites is satisfactory. The sites will concentrate on the quality of signposting guaranteeing rapid access to these points by the personnel. Generalised adoption of badges for automatic personnel counting is expected for all the sites. Emergency management premises: emergency bunker (BDS) The BDS management procedures must be formally laid out in a memo on the sites. The BDS, which is the on-site emergency management building, must be designed to enable the emergency teams to perform their duties and protect the personnel and equipment it contains against hazards, radiation and contamination. The BDS must thus be protected against off-site hazards and it must be able to operate independently. The BDS premises must be compatible with the number of persons present in an emergency situation and with the duration of the crisis. They must be able to meet the needs of the persons concerned (water, sanitation, food, iodine tablets). The BDS must also be equipped with means of monitoring bodily contamination, means of measuring the radiological conditions and a decontamination line with all necessary equipment. The availability and operability of the BDS equipment, in particular the backup diesels, must be guaranteed and periodically checked. The effectiveness of the iodine traps must also be regularly verified. BDS management is defined in the site PUI memoranda, in particular comprising the inventory of equipment in each PC. Each of the BDS visited contains fax machines specifically for transmission and for reception and clearly identified so as to avoid confusion. The useful documents are present, in particular the directories and procedures. There are sometimes a few discrepancies concerning updating of telephone numbers in the directories. Each site has contamination monitoring systems in the BDS and installs a decontamination line for the staff entering it. Some sites still however need to improve this decontamination line (sufficient number of showers, sanitary facilities in the contaminated zone). Iodine tablets are also present in sufficient quantities. The self-sufficiency of the BDS was checked: most of the premises have daily rations and water for at least 48 hours. However, some sites are short of bottled water in the event of the mains water being undrinkable, which is the case on the Golfech site. The minimum fuel oil level for the diesels offers the BDS at least four days of independent operation (delivery possible within 48 hours). Periodic tests are regularly performed and the level of fuel oil is checked every month. For some sites, the non-floodable nature of the BDS has been checked, but this still has to be demonstrated for others. Similarly, the seismic resistance of the BDS is often uncertain. The mounting of the communication equipment (telephones, faxes, computers, printers, etc.) on the tables on which it is placed, or even the strength of the satellite antenna, also need to be confirmed. The iodine trap effectiveness tests were checked and are generally satisfactory. Habitability and access have not always been demonstrated in the event of a severe accident (Gravelines). Finally, over-pressurisation of the BDS has yet to be demonstrated for certain sites, in particular Golfech. Management of the emergency bunker on each site is therefore still open to improvement. Resistance of the premises to off-site hazards (flooding and earthquake) is still to be verified or proven, as is over-
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