- 24 - Chooz). Other sites have never carried out this type of exercise, but some plan to do so (Nogent). Finally, experience feedback from these exercises is not always taken into account (Saint-Laurent). At Gravelines, the exercises (2010) showed that the mobile pumping resources are not utilised regularly enough to guarantee pumping within a reasonable time. On several sites, the inspectors carried out exercises with the mobile pumping resources and were on the whole satisfied with the results at Cattenom, Penly, Saint-Alban and Fessenheim. However, at Tricastin, during the three exercises held, a number of anomalies were identified and the inspectors noted that the cofferdam deployment plan is not ergonomic, that the identification of the cofferdams is confusing, that the mobile protection system deployment report is not exhaustive and that the seals used are of poor quality. The exercise carried out during the inspection of Saint-Alban showed that some of the steps required by the procedures are inadequate: action liable to lead to radioactive releases off the site (in a scenario in which the flood water is contaminated with radioactive particles), fire door not blocked and liable to damage the pump hose, action entailing a breach of containment and fire sectoring, incomplete fire procedure leading to absence of PV control in certain cases. The conclusions of the exercise performed at Cruas also showed that improvements are needed with regard to the storage of pumping equipment, the deployment time (3 hours), the length of electrical cables, and so on. Overall, the inspectors observed that few sites actually deploy the MMP during exercises designed in particular to improve the procedures in place and train the staff for these situations. ASN finds that MMP deployment exercises and actual operating tests should be performed on all the sites at least once a year and that the lessons learned must be incorporated into the procedures. 2.1.17 Overall evaluation of the "protection of facilities in an off-site flooding situation" ASN considers that the organisation put into place to manage the risk of flooding provides a satisfactory response to its expectations. The same applies to multi-unit management, isolation management (except at Tricastin and Cruas) and the diversity of communication resources. However, ASN finds that management of volumetric protection needs to be improved on several sites. EDF will therefore have to focus its efforts on volumetric protection monitoring and maintenance. EDF will also be required to define and hold exercises for testing the equipment and crews in this type of situation and take account of the feedback from these exercises. Finally, EDF will have to improve: rigorous application on the sites of the particular flood operating rules; monitoring of the meteorological, high water and tidal parameters; the schedule for the performance of the actions decided on as a result of experience feedback from the partial flooding of the Le Blayais site in 1999; management of the mobile pumping resources. 1.22.2 Earthquake protection of the facilities 2.2.1 Introduction Context Earthquakes are among the natural hazards that nuclear facilities must be able to deal with. Protection of the facilities against the risks linked to earthquakes is based on the one hand on the definition of the seismic loadings to be considered in the design and, on the other, on the paraseismic measures to be adopted to prevent the effects associated with these loadings. These measures are designed into the facilities and periodically reassessed according to changing know-how and regulations, in particular on the occasion of the ten-year periodic safety reviews. During these periodic safety reviews, a large number of checks are run by the licensee and evaluated by ASN and the IRSN. Fundamental safety rule RFS 2001-01, which was published in 2001, defines the seismic loadings to be considered. This RFS is supplemented by ASN guide 02.01, dated 2006, which sets out the construction
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