Complementary-safety-assessments-french-nuclear-safety

- 114 - Material provisions In its CSA reports, EDF indicates that the elevation of the site platforms was set according to the water height initially calculated. It should be noted that RFS I.2.e was published in 1984 and certain elevations were thus calculated using different methodologies. Since the design of the sites, these heights have thus been re-evaluated to take account of:  Evolution of the calculation rules (publication of RFS I.2.e for example);  a broader range of data;  evolution of available knowledge (modelling techniques for example);  operating experience feedback from the incident at Le Blayais in 1999. The following table shows some of the steps taken by EDF to protect the plants against the risk of flooding (flood, dam burst, rainfall, etc.): Existing protection Blayais Embankments Belleville Peripheral embankments Bugey Protective embankments and walls Cattenom Platform elevation Chinon Flood gates (cofferdams) Chooz Platform elevation Civaux Platform elevation Cruas Banks of the Rhone + Northern periphery wall Dampierre East and South protection embankments Fessenheim GCA Protection bank and embankment Flamanville Platform elevation Gravelines Intake channel walls and embankments Golfech Platform elevation Nogent Platform elevation Paluel Platform elevation Penly Platform elevation Saint Alban North and East wall Saint Laurent Platform elevation Tricastin "Gaffière" stream protections and Donzère canal embankments In its CSA reports, EDF presents the steps taken to protect the sites against flooding. These steps are based on the approach adopted by all the sites following the partial flooding at Le Blayais ("Le Blayais operating experience feedback" approach). EDF conducted a safety analysis for each site, drawing up a list of systems and equipment necessary to reach and maintain a safe state. For all of the sites, EDF also took account of all the support systems contributing to their operation (electricity sources, I&C, fluids) and certain air-conditioning or ventilation systems. The CSA reports give the list of these systems and equipment for each of the sites. EDF has differentiated between two equipment categories: those of the nuclear island and those of the pumping station. In order to reach a conclusion on the absence of water in the premises housing the equipment to be protected in the event of flooding, EDF has adopted a two-step approach: 1. EDF compares the water height liable to be reached at the various possible water inlet points (or bypass); 2. EDF mentions the material and operating measures aimed at protecting the facility against the flood level for which it is designed.

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