the cause of production of the waste, the characteristics of the waste produced or to be produced, an estimation of the waste traffic volumes and a waste zoning plan. In addition, every year, each site sends ASN a summary report on its production of waste and the corresponding disposal routes, a comparison with the results of previous years, a summary of the site organisation and the differences observed with respect to the management procedures specified in the waste management study, the list of significant events which have occurred and the outlook for the future. Prevention of the health impacts caused by the growth of legionella and amoeba in certain cooling systems of the NPP secondary systems The secondary cooling systems of nuclear reactors equipped with a cooling tower are environments favourable to the development of legionella and other amoeba. EDF monitors the legionella and amoeba concentrations and takes preventive measures and, if necessary, remedial measures in accordance with the provisions of ASN resolution 2016-DC-0578 of 6 December 2016 on the prevention of risks resulting from the dispersion of pathogenic micro- organisms (legionella and amoeba) by the cooling installations of the systems. For most of these reactors, preventive and remedial measures to limit the development of legionella and amoeba are based on the injection of a biocidal product (monochloramine) into the cooling system. 2.6.2 Prevention and control of the non-radiological risks Prevention of non-radiological risks with airborne effects The accidents with effects said to be “non-radiological” are those which can arise from the release of hazard potentials not specific to the nuclear activity, insofar as they do not concern radioactive substances. These hazard potentials, which can also be present in other industries covered by the system for Installations Classified for Protection of the Environment (ICPEs), are associated with storage facilities and processes using gaseous or liquid chemical substances. The consideration of these non-radiological accidents is included in the nuclear safety case in accordance with the provisions of Title III of the Order of 7 February 2012, through a specific study known as the non-radiological risks study. This study is drawn up using the methodology applicable to ICPEs. The purpose of this study is to justify the thermal and toxic effects, projectiles or over-pressure effects generated by release of the hazard potentials present on the site and leading to no effects beyond the perimeter of the site. This justification is based, on the one hand, on identification of the hazard potentials (storage facilities or processes) and their potential hazard sources and, on the other, on characterisation of the possible dangerous phenomena and the specific prevention measures for reducing both probability and effects. Each NPP thus has a study of non- radiological risks which analyses and as necessary identifies the possible dangerous phenomena, as well as the specific material and organisational provisions for preventing these phenomena or limiting their effects. Prevention of liquid pollution resulting from accidental spillage of dangerous substances As with numerous industrial activities, the operation of an NPP involves the handling and storage of dangerous liquid chemical substances. The management of these substances and the prevention of pollution, which are the responsibility of the licensee, are regulated by the Order of 7 February 2012 and ASN resolution 2013-DC-0360 of 16 July 2013 and must also comply with the requirements of the European texts. The licensee has obligations regarding the operational management of these substances and the identification of the corresponding potential GRAPH 6 Collective dose for one hour of work in a controlled area (in µSv) 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 6.55 6.20 6.43 5.39 5.85 5.87 5.45 5.80 5.40 5.98 5.96 This Graph includes data for the Fessenheim NPP up until 2020 but does not include the data for the Flamanville NPP EPR reactor in 2024. Source: EDF GRAPH 5 Mean collective dose per reactor (Man.Sv/reactor) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 0.72 0.71 0.61 0.74 0.61 0.73 0.68 0.74 0.75 This Graph includes data for the Fessenheim NPP up until 2020 but does not include the data for the Flamanville NPP EPR reactor in 2024. 0.76 0.67 Source: EDF ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 315 01 The EDF Nuclear Power Plants 10 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 11 12 13 14 15 AP
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