Between 2023 and 2024, ASN carried out a campaign of specific inspections on the operability of the control actions required in the event of an accident with core melt. The conclusions of this inspection campaign are presented in the specific box (see box above). Emergency organisation When the situation in the installation deteriorates or additional means are needed to manage the situation, the incident or accident operating procedures provide for activation of the PUI, which leads to deployment of an emergency organisation. In 2024, three NPPs activated their emergency organisation for a fire outside the controlled area, in other words in an area not containing any radioactive substances: on 10 February in the Chinon NPP, on 28 May in the Paluel NPP and on 3 June in the Cattenom NPP. The Belleville-sur-Loire NPP also deployed its emergency organisation for a hydrochloric acid leak on 22 May, although without triggering the PUI, which contains no provision for this type of scenario. The NPP reactively applied the relevant instructions and notified ASN. A project for updating the specific organisation to manage non-radiological emergency situations, called “PUI TOX”, was transmitted to ASN. This organisation should be deployed nationwide to all NPPs by the end of 2025. These four situations had a limited impact inside the installations and required no population protection measures. In order to test the emergency organisation of EDF and the public authorities, ASN takes part in national exercises. Four exercises of this type were held in 2024 on the NPPs (Civaux, Bugey, Belleville- sur-Loire and Tricastin). ASN also carried out several inspections on the EDF emergency organisation and resources. These inspections, some of which are based on unscheduled situational exercises leading to activation of the site’s emergency organisation, were also an opportunity to test the operational nature of the system on specific subjects (emergency premises equipment, documentation, training, compliance with processes, etc.). Overall, these exercises and inspections demonstrated that the EDF sites have assimilated the principles of organisation, preparedness and management of emergency situations to the extent that they can take the required action in the event of an emergency. ASN also underlines the professionalism and motivation of the on-call personnel mobilised. EDF must however continue its efforts concerning monitoring of through-life support for the resources that could be mobilised in an emergency situation, and the corresponding procedures, the practice and training of the emergency crew members, and in terms of carrying out and monitoring experience feedback from real situations and exercises. Finally, EDF must continue to reinforce preparedness for emergency situations of non-radiological origin. 2.4.3 The Operating Experience Feedback process It is essential for EDF to take account of OEF from the operation of its installations and those of other licensees if safety is to be continuously improved. This is based on the collection and analysis of events. Significant events are analysed individually. This analysis aims to identify their root causes and the changes required to prevent them from happening again. Analyses of trends and weak signals are regularly performed by EDF to identify the deterioration of installations safety as far upstream as possible. EDF pays particular attention to detecting and analysing potentially generic significant events detected on one reactor, but which could affect others. 2.4.4 Assessment of the Operating Experience Feedback process The Operating Experience Feedback process ASN analyses the significant event notifications and reports transmitted by EDF to ensure that they are pertinent. It also carries out inspections on the NPPs to ensure that the OEF process is correctly implemented. The quality and availability of the resources assigned to the in-depth analyses of significant events are satisfactory on all the sites, which is a positive point. However, ASN finds that the involvement of HOF specialists is sometimes inadequate, owing to a lack of trained personnel. The analyses reveal that the apparent causes and the root causes are generally correctly identified and dealt with through adequate measures, even if the analyses all too often simply focus on human failures without sufficiently investigating the influence of the working situation or the organisational processes involved. Complexity of reactor operating baseline requirements The complexity of the operating baseline requirements, notably the RGEs, is regularly highlighted. It may cause the operators to lose sight of the meaning of their work and have effects on risk management. It has risen significantly since the reactors first entered service. To address these findings, EDF began work on short and medium-term simplification, along with a long-term project for a complete overhaul of its RGEs. EDF aims on the one hand to simplify the baseline operating requirements, to make them more legible and easier to use by the operator, and on the other to guarantee the operability of the installations, using an approach proportionate to the safety issues. Discussions were held on the subject by ASN, IRSN and EDF in 2024. For its part, ASN convened the profession in 2024 during a brainstorming cycle by the Steering Committee on Social, Organisational and Human Factors (Cofsoh), as well as to look at the complexity of activities related to the operation of nuclear facilities. A summary of this work will be published in 2025. ASN is also currently financing a thesis on the parameters and dynamics of the complexity of reactor safety governance in France. This thesis should be defended and its conclusions communicated by the end of 2025. Campaign of inspections on the management of accidents with core melt Between 2023 and 2024, ASN carried out a campaign of inspections aimed at checking the operators’ preparedness for managing an accident with core melt and checking the operability of the required control actions. Even if ASN found that the condition of the equipment required during an accident with core melt was generally satisfactory, the inspections also revealed that the baseline requirements documentation produced by the EDF head office departments was not always correctly deployed within the NPPs. In addition, the situational exercises performed during the inspections showed that the field operatives were poorly prepared for accident situations with core melt. The operational documentation allowing performance of the required actions was also sometimes unsuitable (missing or erroneous information, unavailable tools, etc.). These deviations can notably be explained by the fact that the sites do not systematically test the operational documentation before validating it. In response to these findings, EDF defined an action plan, the implementation of which will be monitored by ASNR. 308 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 The EDF Nuclear Power Plants
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