anomalies. To do this, it holds interviews with the control teams and attends operations needed for the NPPs to function. Failures to comply with the RGEs constitute significant events which are to be reported to ASN. ASN analyses the origin and consequences of these events and, during its inspections, checks that measures have been taken by the licensee to correct the deviations and prevent them from happening again. With regard to the operation and control of the reactors, ASN considers that performance remained at a good level in 2024. The action plans on operational rigorousness initiated by the NPPs in recent years would appear to be effective. However, the number of situations for which the reactors were operated outside the planned limits rose in 2024, even though industrial activity was similar to that in 2023. ASN also finds that the quality of monitoring in the control room is continuing to degrade. Moreover, there were several significant events in 2024 related to reactivity control, but which were due to poor organisation, operational documentation faults or shift crew errors. Given the rise in this type of events, ASNR will incorporate specific inspections on this subject into its 2025-2026 inspection programme. In 2024, ASN continued its inspection campaign on systems configuration management (see box previous page). It positively notes the efforts made by EDF to improve the performance of the tools designed to take account of the actual configuration of the systems when programming maintenance work. In 2024, EDF also brought in periodic skills currency training courses for the field operatives involved. ASN checks that the periodic tests of safety-important equipment items do effectively check their operation and level of performance. It carries out this verification during the review of RGE modification authorisation applications. During inspections, it also verifies that these periodic tests are carried out in accordance with the test programmes stipulated in the RGEs. As in previous years, the origin of several Significant Safety Events (ESS) was the periodic tests. The main causes of these significant events are incorrect specification of the test rules in the operating documents, errors in application of the test procedure when performing tests, inconsistencies between documents, or periodic test programming errors. Further to OEF from these events, EDF is adapting its organisations to ensure better sharing of information between the various actors responsible for defining, programming and carrying out tests. In this respect, EDF launched an action plan in October 2023, with the aim of setting up more structured and appropriate support for the sites on this topic, in order to improve the performance of the periodic tests. In 2024, ASN started a programme of specific inspections on the organisation of the sites for management of periodic tests. A large number of the NPPs was inspected during these inspections, which will continue in 2025. ASNR will issue the results at the end of this campaign. Skills management In 2022 and 2023, ASN ran an inspection campaign on the skills management of the teams in charge of operating the installations. This campaign led EDF to deploy national and local action plans aimed at reinforcing the skills of the control teams and revitalising the management of skills as a whole. EDF thus took measures to reinforce the training teams, revive the training committees, support the clarification and adoption of the training processes and increase the amount of training equipment. In 2024, difficulties linked to skills management, which had already been raised in 2023, continue and concern both EDF internal staff and outside contractors. The persistence of difficulties with skills management, despite the numerous action plans, calls into question the effectiveness of the steps taken by the licensee to support skills learning and currency among the teams. ASN notably observed difficulties with identifying training needs. The adoption of “rubbing off” training (informal process for learning based on contact with peers) - with no definition of the teaching objectives - makes it complicated to establish a true view of the competence of the teams. Moreover, training via e-learning, including for technical fields, limits practical implementation in the field. Weaknesses were also found in the organisation of the recycling sessions, owing to the unavailability of training resources or trainers, and the use of questionnaires with no practical work. Skills management linked to subcontracted activities also has difficulties in identifying and securing the skills needed. The Independent Safety Organisation During its inspections, ASN examines the actions of the Independent Safety Organisation (FIS – see box above) and checks that its opinions are correctly taken into account by the operational departments. The inspectors noted the competence, correct working and independence of the FIS. Some sites are however still encountering resource problems, with the number of safety engineers often being below the target levels, for long periods of time. In 2023, EDF took steps to boost its safety engineer numbers, so that they can calmly perform their independent verification of reactor safety. These measures enable the situation to be gradually improved, EDF having set itself a target time-frame of 2027. Operation in an incident, accident, or severe accident situation ASN checks the processes to draft and validate the incident or accident operating rules, their pertinence and how they are implemented. ASN thus carried out several inspections in 2024 on the organisational and technical arrangements made by EDF to deal with an incident and accident situation. These inspections always include a situational exercise for the facility’s control teams, to check the application of instructions and intervention and communication practices within these teams. Following these inspections, as in previous years, ASN once again found errors and lack of precision in the operating documents. Validation by control room simulation of the incident and accident operating instructions is an important step in ensuring the operability of these instructions. These validations generally enable anomalies to be detected. However, ASN found that some sites do not systematically carry out this validation step. ASN considers that EDF should generalise this step. ASN also found that the time taken to correct anomalies detected following local simulation validations remains too long. This delay is notably linked to the fact that a significant share of these anomalies requires exchanges with issue of a position statement by the engineering head office departments. The Independent Safety Organisation At EDF, the Independent Safety Organisation (FIS) verifies the actions and decisions taken by the departments in charge of operating the installations, from the viewpoint of safety. On each NPP, the FIS notably comprises safety engineers and auditors, who conduct a daily check on the safety of the reactors. The working of each FIS is checked and evaluated at a national level by the FIS of EDF’s Nuclear Production Division. Finally, the EDF internal inspectorate services, in particular the general inspector for nuclear safety, reporting to the Chairman of the EDF group, and assisted by a team of inspectors, represents the highest level of independent verification of nuclear safety within the EDF group. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 307 01 The EDF Nuclear Power Plants 10 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 11 12 13 14 15 AP
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