International transfers of radioactive sources: the prior consent procedure It is of crucial importance to ensure the control of sealed radioactive sources and to protect them against malicious acts during their import or export. The IAEA has published a document entitled “Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources “, with the aim of providing its members with a consistent international framework. This framework is not mandatory, but is intended to be taken into account by the IAEA member states in their regulations. It aims to ensure regulatory control that is as harmonised as possible throughout the transfer of the sources between the originating and destination countries. The guidelines are complementary to those of the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. To date, 135 countries, including France, have undertaken to take up these principles in their regulations. The Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources was first published in 2005, two years after the approval of the Code of Conduct. The current version, revised in 2012, focuses primarily on category 1 and 2 radioactive sources (the most dangerous), used predominantly in medical and industrial applications. Maintaining control of these sources during their import or export is vital given their high radioactivity, which makes them a threat in the event of accidental radiation exposure or illegal or unauthorised use. The guidance notably recommends that the consent of the importing country be obtained before export of category 1 sources is permitted and that the exporting company send notification to the importing country one week before the planned shipping date (for category 1 or 2 sources). The aim is to know the dates on which category 1 or 2 sources or batches of sources arrive in or leave the national territory, so that a rapid response can be made in the event of an actual or attempted malicious act or an emergency situation (accident, climatic event, etc.). ASN resolution 2015-DC-0521 of 8 September 2015 (see box page 260) has laid down these principles in French law. Forms have been drafted and “points of contact” have been appointed to streamline international information exchanges, as recommended in the IAEA guidance. The consent requests involving France come essentially from three countries: the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. There are just under ten import consents per year, and about half as many export consents. ASN took part in the meeting organised by the IAEA in Vienna in 2024 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the International Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, which was attended by 219 participants from 120 countries. The objective was to discuss the regulatory methods adopted in each country (on the basis of the IAEA recommendations), to promote the best practices and to address the difficulties encountered with requests for radioactive source transfers between countries. The need to continue to improve transparency and communication between the IAEA member countries in order to facilitate the consent processes during these movements was underlined. ASN gave a presentation emphasising the importance of the accuracy of the information exchanged between countries and provided by the requesting parties. The discussions confirmed both the need to train the personnel involved and the difficulties frequently encountered during these operations. For example, what action should be taken if the exporting country does not acknowledge the IAEA guidance principles or if the importing country is slow in providing the required information? Questions of this type were at the centre of the discussions, demonstrating the shared desire to find solutions that streamline the exchanges and ensure safe international transfers of sources. ∙the obligation to notify promptly the various administrative authorities, particularly the regionally competent law enforcement agencies, of any actual or attempted malicious act or loss concerning a source of ionising radiation or a batch of radioactive sources of category A, B or C (R. 1333‑22); ∙the sending of sensitive information, that is to say elements that could facilitate malicious acts by separate, specially identified mail (R. 1333‑130); ∙the issuing of a nominative and written authorisation to the persons having access to ionising radiation sources or batches of radioactive sources in category A, B or C, transporting them, or having access to information concerning their protection against malicious acts (R. 1333‑148). Subsequently, the Ministerial Order setting the organisational and technical requirements to protect sources of ionising radiation (or batches of radioactive sources) against malicious acts was signed on 29 November 2019 and published in the Official Journal of the French Republic on 11 December 2019. Its provisions were brought progressively into effect over a period extending to the end of 2022. Today they are all applicable. The Order of 29 November 2019 amended also applies to the transport of category A, B and C sources, whether individually or in batches. The main requirements of this Order aim, by adopting a graded approach based on categories A, B, C (and D for two items), to have the licensee put in place physical barriers and equipment, along with a policy and an internal organisation to protect sources against malicious acts. These technical and organisational provisions are intended to: ∙prevent or delay the theft of radio- active sources through access control measures, reinforcement of physical barriers and their openings (doors, windows, etc.), alarms and crossing-detection; ∙protect sensitive information (access limited to duly authorised personnel, promotion of good information technology security practices); ∙detect an actual or attempted malicious act (theft in particular) as early as possible; ∙take action or alert the local law enforcement agencies after preparing their on-site actions; ∙raise awareness, inform, and regularly train the personnel in the issue; ∙periodically check the effectiveness of the equipment and organise exercises. For obvious reasons of restricting access to sensitive information, some of the provisions of this Order, detailed in its appendices, were not published in the Official Journal. ASN therefore, within its area of competence, sent the relevant appendices by personalised letter to each of the RNAs concerned. ASN also accompanied the publishing of the Order by actions in the regions at professional events between 2020 and 2022 and by holding ad hoc meetings with professionals concerned. To help with the understanding of this Order, which introduced a new regulatory field that is little known to the RNAs, two important documents have also been produced: ∙A guide produced jointly by ASN/SHFDS (Service of the Defence and Security High Official) so that professionals and inspectors alike have a common understanding of the requirements of the Order. ∙A guide on assessing the break-in resistance of opening elements: doors, shutters, windows, etc. Nowadays, professional reference systems and standards addressing protection against malicious acts enable this aspect to be covered satisfactorily from the technical viewpoint. However, the majority of the facilities concerned were built at a time when little consideration was given to the question of malicious acts. Based on the work of IRSN, which has an office specialised in the physical protection of facilities, a guide assigning a number of points to the leaves, locks and hinges of an opening element enables it to be given an overall rating and decide whether it complies with the requirements of the appendices of the Order. 258 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 Sources of ionising radiation and their industrial, veterinary and research applications
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