The ASN emergency organisation was called on several times in 2024, following triggering of the PUI on nuclear installations. In 2024, three NPPs triggered their PUI following an outbreak of fire in an area situated outside the controlled area (in other words, outside the nuclear area): the Chinon NPP in February (transformer fire), the Paluel NPP in May (transformer fire) and the Cattenom NPP in June (fire in a ventilation room). In each case, the on-call team was activated in order to monitor the development of the situation and prepare to activate the Emergency Centre if necessary. These three situations were rapidly brought under control by the EDF teams, leading to no consequences for the safety of the installations. Each time, ASN authorised lifting of the PUI a few hours after it was triggered. On 10 April 2024 at 18h30, ASN was informed by the Apave company that a radioactive source had become blocked during radiographic inspections by Apave NDT on the site of the ADF company in Colmar (Haut-Rhin département). The ASN on-call team, along with the ASN Strasbourg division, monitored the event so that they could assist the public authorities in managing it (see chapter 8). On 11 December 2024 at 13h21, the ASN on-call team decided to activate its Montrouge Emergency Centre after being alerted regarding a fire on the Orano site in Bessines-sur-Gartempe. ASN monitored the situation jointly with the prefecture of the Haute-Vienne département, the licensee and IRSN. The situation was brought under control by the Orano teams on the site in mid-afternoon and the ASN Emergency Centre was deactivated at 16h30. The IRSN sent its environmental monitoring resources to the site, which confirmed that there were no radioactive releases. During exercises, or in the event of a real emergency, ASN is supported by a team of analysts working in IRSN’s Technical Emergency Centre. ASN’s alert system allows mobilisation of its Emergency Centre staff and those of IRSN. This automatic system sends an alert signal to the staff equipped with appropriate reception devices, as soon as it is remotely triggered by the BNI licensee originating the alert. It also sends the alert to the staff of the SGDSN, the General Directorate for Civil Security and Emergency Management (DGSCGC), the Interministerial Emergency Management Operations Centre, MétéoFrance and the Ministerial operational monitoring and alert centre (CMVOA) of the Ministries for Regional Planning and for Ecological Transition. A radiological emergency toll-free number also enables ASN to receive calls reporting events involving sources of ionising radiation used outside BNIs or during the transport of radioactive substances. It is accessible 24/7. This number is reserved for companies holding a licence to possess radioactive sources issued by ASN in accordance with the Public Health Code and for companies transporting radio- active materials. Depending on the severity of the event, ASN may activate its Montrouge Emergency Centre by triggering the alert system. If not, only the ASN local level (regional division concerned) intervenes to perform its Prefect support and communication duties, if necessary, calling on the expertise of the national departments. In order to enhance the graded nature of the ASN response and organisation in the event of an emergency, for situations not warranting activation of the Emergency Centre, the on-call team provides assistance to support the regional division concerned. Since 2018, an on-call duty system reinforces the robustness and the mobilisation and intervention reactivity of the ASN staff. Diagram 2 (see previous page) summarises the role of ASN in a nuclear emergency situation. This functional diagram illustrates the importance of the ASN representative to the Prefect, who relays and explains the recommendations coming from the ASN Emergency Centre. Table 1 shows the positions of the public authorities (Government, ASN and technical experts) and the licensees in a radiological emergency situation. These players each operate in their respective fields of competence with regard to assessment, decision-making, intervention and communication, for which regular audio- conferences are held. The exchanges between the players lead to decisions and orientations concerning the safety of the facility and the protection of the general public. Similarly, relations between the communication units and the spokespersons of the emergency centres ensure that the public and media are given coherent information. 3 Learning from experience 3.1 Carrying out exercises The main aim of these nuclear and radiological emergency exercises is to test the planned response in the event of a radiological emergency, in order: ∙to measure the level of preparedness of all the entities involved (safety Authorities, technical experts, licensees); ∙to ensure that the plans are kept up to date, that they are well-known to those in charge and to the participants at all levels and that the alert and coordination procedures they contain are effective; ∙to train those who would be involved in such a situation; ∙to implement the various aspects of the organisation and the procedures set out in the Interministerial Directives: the emergency plans, the contingency plans, the local safeguard plans and the various conventions; ∙to contribute to informing the media and to develop a general public information approach so that everyone can, through their own individual behaviour, contribute to civil protection; ∙to build on emergency situation management knowledge and experience. These exercises, which are scheduled by an annual interministerial instruction, involve the licensee, the Ministries, the offices of the Prefects and services of the départements, ASN, the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND), IRSN and Météo-France, which can represent up to 300 people when resources are deployed in the field. They aim to test the effectiveness of the provisions made for assessing the situation, the ability to bring the installation or the package to a safe condition, to take appropriate measures to protect the general public and to ensure satisfactory communication with the media and the populations concerned. TABLE 1 Positions of the various stakeholders in a radiological emergency situation Decision Expert appraisal Intervention Communication Public authorities Government (CIC) Prefecture (COD, COZ) – Prefecture Civil protection Government (CIC) Prefecture (COD) ASN (CU) IRSN (CTC) Météo‑France IRSN (mobile units) ASN IRSN Licensees National and local levels National and local levels Local level National and local levels CIC: Interministerial Crisis Committee - COD: Departmental Operations Centre – COZ: Zone Operations Centre - CTC: Emergency Technical Centre – CU: Emergency Centre ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 179 01 02 03 Radiological emergency and post-accident situations 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 AP
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