carried out, whereas in reality it has not, could – depending on the circumstances – be a breach of the rules of organisation, technical inspection of activities, skills management, etc. For a number of years now the CFS search has become one of the usual inspection practices and specific internal tools have been made available to the inspectors. Incorporating CFS into inspections corresponds to three contexts: ∙inspections further to known subjects, resulting from CFS discovered in other facilities, or to monitor the processing of a case previously detected; ∙inspections including an in-depth search for proof in the performance of activities, for example with verification of the actual presence of a person who certified that they had carried out an activity on a given date, or the examination of inspection registration source data; ∙inspections with the purpose of raising awareness concerning the risks of CFS, notably during supplier inspections, where the risk of CFS in the subcontracting chain is dealt with. This is a priority subject of inspection for ASN. An inspection campaign on all the BNIs was launched in 2024 and will continue in 2025. It concerns the organisations in place in the installations to prevent and process CFS. The inspections of this campaign, focusing on organisational and human factors, include numerous interviews with the various stakeholders in the life of the installations, from the hierarchy responsible for CFS aspects down to the operatives performing various works in the installations. More than 70 inspections of this type were carried out in 2024. They mainly took place on the nuclear sites and at the manufacturers of equipment intended for use there. Inspections devoted to this topic were also carried out in the head office departments of the main nuclear licensees. The cases detected are first of all dealt with as deviations from the regulatory requirements. They are also the subject of discussions with the site management and the head office departments of the licensees, so that preventive action can be taken. Depending on the potential implications of the deviation, a violation report can be drafted or, in the event of a misdemeanour, the Public Prosecutor’s Office is notified and they are then responsible for determining whether or not to prosecute (Article 40 of the Penal Procedure Code). In 2024, ASN issued three reports. When the Public Prosecutor initiates investigations, ASN provides support for the investigators appointed by the legal authorities for technical analysis of documents and to facilitate dealings with the nuclear licensees. In addition, the question of data integrity – that is ensuring that data have not been modified or destroyed without authorisation – linked to the risk of CFS, given that shortcomings in traceability can facilitate irregularities, continued to be frequently addressed since 2023 and formed the subject of requirements in several inspection follow-up letters. New CFS are still being detected, both by the licensees, within the context of their monitoring and internal checks, and by the ASN inspectors. In 2024, 104 were examined by ASN, whether suspected cases, proven cases or cases finally cleared after analysis. This significant increase in the number of cases identified by comparison with 2023 can be explained by three main factors: ∙the licensees, EDF in particular, continued to implement their CFS prevention, detection and processing actions. The inspections they carried out resulted in higher levels of detection; ∙ASN’s CFS inspection campaign mentioned above enabled the inspectors to detect CFS but also to collect more information from the licensees; ∙greater publicity concerning the ASN whistle-blower system (see point 5.2) leads to new cases being identified. CFS cases are being followed-up and processed in close collaboration with the licensees and manufacturers. The CFS typology can be presented as follows: ∙80 concern cases specific to a facility, with no potential generic component (action signed off as done but absence in controlled area, falsification of performance of an activity or qualification of welders, etc.); ∙15 cases concern suppliers for which investigations were needed to check the absence of CFS, expanded to several licensees or suppliers (untraced or hidden weld repairs, supply of parts outside traceability circuit by “brokers”, etc.). These cases led ASN to ask the licensees and manufacturer to check whether they were concerned (3 letters sent); ∙6 cases illustrate the potential of finding CFS in a related area such as approved or certified organisations: falsification of RPO certification, addition to an RPE-O appointment document without new signature, service provided as an approved organisation for radon measurements but without approval; ∙3 are cases found by ASN staff monitoring of news from abroad. Most of them lead to discussions with the licensees and manufacturers. Finally, on 26 February 2024, the ASN Commission held a hearing of the EDF CEO on the subject of counterfeit, falsification and suspected fraud in the nuclear field. More details are given in the box in chapter 10. ASN’s actions to prevent, detect and process CFS are not limited just to the inspections. For example, ASN informs the main licensees and manufacturers of the cases detected and analyses their responses. It holds bilateral discussions or inspection cross-observations with foreign safety regulators, through an international exchange channel that it actively helped to set up. In addition, ASN is making the suppliers aware of this. A specific informative guide (available in English and French) intended for the nuclear sector suppliers was published in 2024. One part of it is devoted to CFS. Communication regarding cases of CFS dealt with by ASN could compromise other secret information protected by law, notably guarantees of strict confidentiality surrounding the authors of cases reported, the persons or companies involved, any third party mentioned and information collected by all recipients. ASN thus handles all these subjects confidentially and communicates no details. 5.2 Processing of reported cases At the end of November 2018, ASN set up a portal to enable anyone wishing to notify it of irregularities potentially affecting the protection of persons and the environment (whistle-blower) to do so. Act 2022-401 of 21 March 2022 aiming to improve whistle-blower protection, which modifies the system created by the “Sapin 2” Act of 9 December 2016, entered into force on 1 September 2022. It is supplemented by Constitutional Act 2022-400 of the same date, which aims to reinforce the role of the Defender of whistle- blower rights. These two Acts reinforce the whistle-blower protection system. They transpose Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of 23 October 2019 defining a common framework for this protection and take it even further. A broader definition of whistle-blower, simplification of the alert procedures, reinforcement of the whistle-blower protections, a new status for the entourage of the whistle-blower and an expansion of the roles of the Defender of Rights with regard to whistleblowing are the main contributions of these Acts. Furthermore, Decree 2022-1284 of 3 October 2022 relative to the procedures for collecting and processing alerts submitted by whistle-blowers and setting out the list of external authorities instituted by the above-mentioned Act 2022-401 supplements these provisions by detailing the whistle-blowing report processing mechanisms. This Decree designated ASN as having competence to process whistle-blower alerts regarding radiation protection and nuclear safety. The system set up by ASN, which was originally voluntary, has been added to and meets these obligations. By means of a system of pseudonyms for the reports received, ASN guarantees the confidentiality of anyone sending it 166 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2024 Regulation of nuclear activities and exposure to ionising radiation
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