MANAGEMENT OF DEVIATIONS ASN f inds that progress in the management of deviations is required in certain facilities, notably with regard to analysis of causes or of trends concerning repeated deviations of a similar nature. In 2021, CEA informed ASN of the fall of a “medium activity” waste package into a storage pit of the Cedra facility (BNI 164) as well as the fall of a basket containing sections of fuel rods during placement in a storage pit in the STAR BNI. ASN hopes that CEA will learn the lessons from these handling problems, so that they do not occur in other facilities. CHANGE MANAGEMENT ASN considers that the quality of the safety analyses sent to ASN when CEA submits an authorisation application for a noteworthy modif ication is on the whole satisfactory. ASN also observes that the changes made in the f ield do effectively correspond to the information provided by CEA in its authorisation applications. MAINTENANCE AND THE SCHEDULING OF PERIODIC INSPECTIONS AND TESTS Maintenance work and the scheduling of the periodic inspections and tests, their performance and their monitoring within the CEA facilities are on the whole satisfactory. As these operations are generally subcontracted, CEA must however remain attentive to the level of technical competence. Moreover, ASN still observes disparities between the facilities. In addition, the traceability of the inspections performed must be further improved. CEA must also implement a harmonised materials ageing and obsolescence management strategy for all its facilities. The newmethodology developed by CEA to manage the ageing of the Cabri reactor (BNI 24) represents a step forward. OUTSIDE CONTRACTORS Although the monitoring of outside contractors has been reinforced in recent years, ASN still notes the need for the CEA to reinforce the monitoring of the entire chain of outside contractors, particularly its contractors’ subcontractors. Lastly, there are still disparities in the quality of this monitoring between the various facilities operated by CEA, and harmoni– sation is thus required. RISK CONTROL AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASN considers that CEA must continue its efforts to improve protection against the f ire risk. Management of the technical devices (fire doors and dampers, detection systems, etc.), must be improved and f ire loads limited, particularly on worksites. CEA’s emergency organisation and resources still need to be signif icantly improved, in order to make up the delay in meeting the current requirements. The national organisation in particular needs to be reinforced, paying very close attention to the coordination between the national level, the sites and the facilities. ASN noted that the teams in the field, notably the local safety force, are engaged and motivated in the performance of emergency exercises. Coordination between the local safety force and the facilities in the CEA centres however still needs to be improved with regard to the management of permanent resources (retention areas, automatic shut-off devices, etc.), as the priority of the local safety force is to extinguish f ires. ASN also observes signif icant delays in the construction of the emergency management buildings for the Cadarache and Saclay centres, designed to take account of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. PERSONNEL RADIATION PROTECTION Within the various CEA centres, radiation protection is on the whole dealt with satisfactorily. ASN remains vigilant with regard to the identif ication of items and activities important for protection, management of measuring instrument ageing and monitoring of outside contractors (handling of deviations, traceability and application of the “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” –ALARA approach). Most of the signif icant radiation protection events reported by CEA are linked to failure to wear a passive dosimeter and problems with the radiological cleanliness of the premises. Of these events, only one was rated level 1 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) and concerned the failure by an outside contractor to wear personal protection equipment. In 2022, ASN will ensure that CEA reinforces the worker radiation protection provisions, monitoring of their application, and of the outside contractors in its facilities. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION For the year 2021, control of the detrimental effects and impact of the CEA facilities on the environment is on the whole satisfactory. The number of deviations in 2021 is approximately the same as in previous years. ASN considers that CEA must continue to implement measures on a number of subjects relating to environmental protection, management of the ageing of liquid effluent networks and repair of the network of piezometers, all of which will require long-term action. INDIVIDUAL FACILITY ASSESSMENTS The ASN assessments of each centre and each nuclear facility are detailed in the Regional Overview in this report. ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 17 ASN ASSESSMENTS PER LICENSEE AND BY ACTIVITY SECTOR
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