ASN Report 2018

The PPI comprises a “reflex” phase which includes an immediate licensee alert of the populations within a 2 km radius of the facility, requiring them to take shelter and await instructions. The additional measures to be taken beyond the zone covered by the PPI are specified, as applicable, through a joint approach which can be based on the Orsec arrangements, taking account of the characteristics of the accident and the weather conditions. PPI revision work started in 2018 enables the municipalities concerned by the extension of these plans to be defined. ASN also assists the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate for Civil Security and Emergency Management (DGSCGC) with a view to supplementing the PPIs concerning aspects relating to post-accident management (see point 1.5). 1.2  ̶  Controlling urban development around nuclear sites The aim of controlling urban development is to limit the consequences of an accident for the population and property. Since 1987, this type of approach has been implemented around non-nuclear industrial facilities and it has been reinforced since the AZF facility accident that occurred in Toulouse in 2001. Act 2006-686 of 13 June 2006 concerning transparency and security on nuclear matters (TSN Act, now codified in Books I and V of the Environment Code), enables the public authorities to control urban development around BNIs, by implementing institutional controls limiting or prohibiting new constructions in the vicinity of these facilities. Given the specific nature of nuclear or radiological emergency management and of the corresponding risks, the steps taken for BNIs could be harsher than for Installations Classified for Protection of the Environment and lead to more stringent measures. The actions to control urban development entail a division of responsibilities between the licensee, the mayors and the State: ∙ ∙ The licensee is responsible for its activities and the related risks. ∙ ∙ The mayor is responsible for producing the town planning documents and issuing building permits. ∙ ∙ The Prefect informs the mayors of the existing risks, verifies the legality of the steps taken by the local authorities and may impose institutional controls as necessary. ASN supplies technical data in order to characterise the risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban development control process. The current approach to controlling activities around nuclear facilities exclusively concerns those subject to a PPI and primarily aims to preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans, in particular for sheltering and evacuation, limiting the population numbers concerned whenever possible. It focuses on the PPI “reflex” zones, determined by the Circular of 10 March 2000 revising the Off-site Emergency Plans for BNIs, the pertinence of which was confirmed by the instruction of 3 October 2016. In these “reflex” zones», immediate steps to protect the population are taken in the event of a rapidly developing accident. A Circular from the Ministry responsible for the Environment of 17 February 2010 concerning the control of activities in the vicinity of BNIs liable to present dangers off the site asked the Prefects to exercise increased vigilance with regard to urban development in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. This Circular states that the greatest possible attention must be paid to projects that are sensitive owing to their size, their purpose, or the difficulties they could entail in terms of protection of the general public in the “reflex” zone. ASN is consulted on construction or urban development projects situated within this zone. The opinions issued are based on the principles explained in ASN Guide No. 15 on the control of activities around BNIs published in 2016. This Guide, drawn up by a pluralistic working group jointly overseen by ASN and the General Directorate for Risk Prevention (DGPR), comprising elected officials and the National Association of Local Information Commissions and Committees (Anccli), has the following basic objectives: ∙ ∙ preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans; ∙ ∙ prefer regional development outside the “reflex” zone; ∙ ∙ allow controlled development that meets the needs of the resident population. “Emergency management” in-depth inspection at Tricastin The team for this in-depth inspection, which concerned the topic of emergency situations management, comprised about ten inspectors from around France, the ASN Chief inspector and an inspector from the Defence Nuclear Safety Authority (ASND). The first half-day was devoted to the general organisation of the site in terms of emergency management and a number of specific functions. On the second day, the inspectors turned up at the site entrance in the middle of the night for a large-scale unannounced exercise entailing activation of the On-site Emergency Plan (PUI) (but also, for certain licensees, the PPI “reflex” phase). The simulation was a means of testing both the quality of the site’s operational response and the quality of its emergency organisation. The rest of the inspection concerned the various facilities on the vast Tricastin site, with each team of inspectors carrying out theoretical or practical simulations. This inspection found that, despite certain weaknesses identified in the field and the need for clarification in the sharing of responsibilities in the local “Strategic Management Command Post”, which has subsequently been done through the transition to the single licensee, the site is considered to be able to manage an accident leading to the activation of the PUI on a facility. The inspection also demonstrated the benefits to be gained from performing inspections with field exercises to make ASN’s examination of the provisions of the on-site emergency plans more robust and no doubt faster. 160  ASN report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2018 04 – RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY AND POST-ACCIDENT SITUATIONS